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We measure polarization in the United States Congress using the network science concept
of modularity. Modularity provides a conceptually-clear measure of polarization that reveals
both the number of relevant groups and the strength of inter-group divisions without making
restrictive assumptions about the structure of the party system or the shape of legislator util-
ities. We show that party influence on Congressional blocs varies widely throughout history,
and that existing measures underestimate polarization in periods with weak party structures.
We demonstrate that modularity is a significant predictor of changes in majority party and
that turnover is more prevalent at medium levels of modularity. We show that two variables
related to modularity, called ‘divisiveness’ and ‘solidarity,’ are significant predictors of re-
election success for individual House members. Our results suggest that modularity can serve
as an early warning of changing group dynamics, which are reflected only later by changes
in party labels.
1 Introduction
A great deal of recent research has been devoted to identifying and explaining polarization
in the United States. Indeed, there has been enough to fill the pages of two annual re-
view articles in the past half-decade (Layman et al. 2006, Fiorina & Abrams 2008). At its
core, the polarization debate began with an observation about the nature of partisanship
in Congress. Starting in the late 1970s, researchers began to notice increases in intra-party
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cohesion and decreases in inter-party cooperation on roll-call votes (McCarty et al. 2007).
This finding puzzled scholars because it ran counter to empirical evidence for the weaken-
ing of partisanship in the electorate (Coleman 1996) and the theoretical expectation that
institutional incentives should drive parties to adopt similar (i.e., median) policy positions
(Downs 1957a).
These puzzles form the fault lines of the two major conflicts in the literature on partisan
polarization. The first conflict attempts to locate the origins of partisan polarization either
in the electorate (McCarty et al. 2007), among political elites (Fiorina & Abrams 2008),
or in a combination of the two (Jacobson 2005, Jacobson 2006). The second attempts to
explain the relative influences of party and ideology on Congressional voting, and well-known
publications have argued for party effects (Cox & McCubbins 1993, Cox & McCubbins
2005, Smith 2007), ideological effects (Krehbiel 1991), and interactions between the two
(Rohde 1991, Aldrich & Rohde 2001). In both instances, researchers have pondered how
non-median party positions result from institutions that in theory lend themselves towards
moderation (Layman et al. 2006).
We argue that the polarization debate has been limited by its overemphasis on ex-
pectations derived from spatial models of ideology. By contrast, we define polarization
behaviorally—rather than ideologically—based on the voting decisions made by the legisla-
tors and the way those decisions divide them into distinct groups. To operationalize this
definition, we use the tools of network science. Suppose that each legislator is a ‘node’ in the
network and that the level of agreement between two legislators in roll-call voting indicates
the strength of a ‘tie’ between them.1 In a highly-polarized legislature, we reason that groups
1As discussed in more detail in the online supplementary information, the ties between all pairs of legis-
lators in one legislative body (Senate or House of Representatives) in a single Congress are described by an
adjacency matrix A with elements
Aij =
1
bij
∑
k
γijk , (1)
where γijk equals 1 if legislators i and j voted the same on bill k and 0 otherwise, and bij is the total number
of bills on which both legislators voted.
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like parties contain strong ties between individuals within the same group but relatively weak
ties between individuals in different them. In the extreme case of pure party-line voting, all
members of the same party vote identically and therefore have the strongest possible ties
between each other. They also have the weakest possible ties to members of the other par-
ties. In contrast, individuals in a legislature with low polarization tend to have ties both
to individuals in their own group and to those in other groups, weakening the strength of
group divisions. Here, we utilize network modularity to first identify relevant ‘communities’
(tightly-knit groups) in Congress and then quantify the severity of such a division.
In section 2, we use insights from Downs’s (1957a) model of ideology to explain our cri-
tique of spatial models as tools for measuring partisan polarization. In section 3, we explain
the intuition behind our use of modularity and discuss its advantages over existing measures.
In sections 4 and 5, we present empirical evidence for the utility of modularity in predicting
majority-party switches Congress as well as the electoral fortunes of individual legislators.
We conclude in section 6 by discussing the ongoing role for modularity in advancing our un-
derstanding of party polarization. In online supplementary information, we provide further
details of the network-science methodology, additional figures and tables, and a descriptive
example from the 19th century.
2 Ideology, Information, and Polarization
Political scientists have focused intently on Downs’s median voter theorem (Downs 1957a)
and of the spatial model at its core. However, although the median voter result is nor-
matively appealing, it is also rather fragile. In the Congressional case, adding influential
activists (Aldrich 1995) or rules favoring the majority party (Cox & McCubbins 1993, Cox
& McCubbins 2005) to the model results in ideological divergence of parties. In the presiden-
tial case, empirical investigations show that parties alter the composition of the electorate by
3
appealing to core supporters, which allows them to maintain extreme positions (Holbrook &
McClurg 2005). These results challenge the expectation of median outcomes while maintain-
ing strong assumptions about the nature of ideology, especially as perceived by the electorate.
We argue that these assumptions might not be appropriate to the study of Congressional
polarization.
Although most scholars assume the existence and structure of ideology, Downs argued
that the creation of party ideologies, as well as their tendency to diverge, derives from imper-
fect knowledge in the electorate (Downs 1957b). In a complex world, Downs reasoned, voters
demand a method to reduce information costs associated with making electoral decisions.
Motivated by the desire to increase vote shares (Mayhew 1974), the parties supply ideologies
in response to this demand. Importantly, Downs argued that ideologies reduce information
costs for voters primarily by highlighting differences between parties. He therefore concluded
that ‘parties cannot adopt identical ideologies, because they must create enough product dif-
ferentiation to make their output distinguishable from that of their rivals, so as to entice
voters to the polls’ (Downs 1957b:142). Given incomplete information, it therefore seems
that one should expect some level of polarization rather than convergence to the median.
Additionally, Downs attributed the original position of party ideology to the interests of
those present at that party’s founding but presumed that successful ideologies acquire power
that is independent of any particular interest group (i.e., parties eventually lose control over
the ideologies that they create) (Downs 1957b). Indeed, parties have imperfect information
about the nature of their own ideology. Downs also argued that party ideology must remain
relatively stable once established in order to retain legitimacy, and that subsequent political
actions must offer ‘persistent correlation’ with that ideology in order for it to remain a
useful cognitive shortcut (Downs 1957b:142). Moreover, if a party lacks control over its own
ideologies, then it becomes more difficult both for it to ensure that its ideology is stable and
for it to craft policy that adheres to its ideology.
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In this scenario, ideology is a coordination device between the electorate and the parties.
The parties want to provide just enough information to appear stable and trustworthy to
voters, and voters want just enough information to make decisions between competing par-
ties. If voters are unwilling or unable to demand or process more information (Popkin 1994),
then parties will prefer vague ideologies. Ambiguity allows competing intra-party factions
to appear united to voters who lack the necessary information to expose their contradicting
positions, and it gives parties the opportunity to pursue potentially divisive or polarizing
policies while maintaining the guise of ideological consistency. This helps explain, for ex-
ample, why parties in Congress appear to be radically divided even when the general public
seems not to be so (Fiorina & Abrams 2008) and why partisans in the electorate continue
to support their representatives even when the rest of the public has withdrawn its support
(Jacobson 2005).
This exposition of Downs (1957b) calls into question the assumptions that underly many
studies of ideology, partisanship, and polarization. Scholars traditionally assume that indi-
viduals have complete, transitive, single-peaked preferences over a small number of indepen-
dent ideological dimensions, which presumably represent correlative sets of issue positions
(Poole & Rosenthal 1997). However, given that all actors have imperfect information not
only about the composition of these dimensions but also about the location of party and
electoral medians along them, one encounters the possibility of two actors holding radically
different opinions about the structure of ideology but still thinking that they occupy the
same position. If ideology means different things to different people, then it makes little
sense to assume the opposite. Furthermore, parties have the incentive to provide—and vot-
ers have the incentive to consume—only the minimal amount of information necessary to
distinguish between candidates for office, and this undermines the assumption that actors
have complete and well-ordered preferences over any particular ideological space.
Finally, nearly all rational-choice models assume that actors are able to make better
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political decisions when given more information (Poole 2005). Indeed, spatial models are
rather extreme in this respect: they assume that actors make perfect decisions when they
have perfect information (Krehbiel 1991). For politicians, one typically assumes that perfect
decisions are those that maximize reelection chances (Mayhew 1974). For voters, the story is
different. Though an incomplete-information setting encourages voters to rely on partisan,
ideological, or other cues (Popkin 1994), voters in a complete-information setting are capable
in theory of associating policies with outcomes (rendering such cues unnecessary). In a
complete-information setting, reelection rates should hinge on the ability of politicians to
effectively generate good public policy, ostensibly by processing the maximal amount of
policy information (Krehbiel 1991). This assumption is fundamental to dominant theories
of committee organization in Congress (Shepsle & Weingast 1987). However, empirical
investigations suggest that committees use information polemically as a way of defending
existing partisan positions while appealing to foundational assumptions among voters about
the utility of rational and scientific methods (Shulock 1998). In this case, even analyses
of scientific policy serve as low-information cues about the validity of what are essentially
ideological or partisan positions.
These critiques imply a world in which ideology is a necessary—but frustratingly imprecise—
tool of party competition. Nearly all studies of Congressional polarization treat it as ideolog-
ical and then measure polarization using traditional assumptions. Perhaps the most popular
of these measures, defined by McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal (MPR) (2007), gauges polar-
ization by measuring the Cartesian distance between the mean DW-NOMINATE (which we
hereafter call ‘DW-NOM’) scores of political parties (Poole & Rosenthal 1997). Calculat-
ing these polarization scores requires restrictive assumptions about the nature of ideology in
Congres. DW-NOMINATE assumes the existence of a low-dimensional space with consistent
ideological dimensions over time. This assumption is made in in order to estimate dynamic
ideology scores. W-NOMINATE relaxes this restriction while maintaining the spatial model-
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ing assumptions (Poole 2005). In both cases, measuring the distance between political party
means, furthermore, requires the researcher to assume a particular party system structure.
We compare the modularity measure to polarization scores calculated using both DW- and
W-NOMINATE (see section 4 for more discussion).
While we acknowledge the utility of NOMINATE-based measures for fitting individual
roll-call decisions, we question the value of aggregating ideal-point estimates into measures
of system-wide polarization. In these situations, we reason, it is prudent to also employ
measures that hew more closely to observed behaviors without imposing assumptions about
their rationality or spatial structure. We argue that the polarization debate should be
more concerned with the identification of relevant political groups and the evaluation of
the divisions between them. By moving to a network framework, we can use the tools of
community detection and the diagnostic known as modularity to perform both of these tasks
using more plausible assumptions.
3 The Modularity Measure
When studying a network, it is often useful or convenient for analysis to partition it into
groups. Network scientists have recently developed a measure called modularity (Newman
& Girvan 2004, Newman 2006a) that uses information about the ties between each pair of
individuals in a network to compare the total strength of ties lying within each group to the
total tie strength between individuals from different groups. Previous work has used modu-
larity to study cohesive groups (typically called communities) in legislation cosponsorships
networks in Congress (Zhang et al. 2008), committee membership networks in the House
of Representatives (Porter et al. 2005, Porter et al. 2007), and a large variety of other
real-world and computer-generated networks (Porter et al. 2009, Fortunato 2010). Other
applications of network analysis have also flowered in the political science literature (see,
7
e.g., Huckfeldt 1987, Fowler 2006a, Fowler 2006b, McClurg 2006, Baldassarri & Bearman
2007, Koger et al. 2009, Park et al. 2009, Lazer 2011, Ward et al. 2011).
‘Modular’ networks contain groups that have many ties within them but few between
them. Network scientists call such groups ‘communities’ because they form strongly con-
nected subnetworks that, in the extreme, can be nearly separate from other parts of the
network (Porter et al. 2009, Fortunato 2010). Networks with stronger ties within groups
and weaker ties between groups are thereby more modular. Conceptually, this is exactly what
one means when claiming that groups are polarized. This operationalization of polarization
in roll-call votes allows us to quantify the number of cohesive groups (i.e., communities) in a
legislature, quantify the strength of division between such blocs, identify which individuals
are likely to belong to each cohesive group, and quantify the position of individuals within
their groups.
We employ multiple community-detection algorithms to identify groups that maximize
modularity for each roll-call network for both the Senate and the House of Representatives
in the 1st–109th Congresses.2 Using regression analyses, we find that maximum modularity
is a significant predictor of future majority party changes in the House (and approaches
significance in the Senate). Additionally, we find several periods in American history—most
notably, during the 75th–95th Congresses from 1937 to 1979—in which a large discrepancy
exists between formal party divisions and real voting coalitions. We hypothesize that such
discrepancies, and the corresponding changes in maximum modularity, might serve as an
early warning signal for changes in the partisan composition of Congress (perhaps due to a
failure of parties to coordinate with voters on the definition of ideology). As a preliminary test
of this hypothesis, we use modularity values in Congress t to predict changes in the majority
party for Congress t+ 1. We find a non-monotonic relationship between modularity and the
stability of the majority party in both chambers of Congress. At low levels of modularity,
2We briefly discuss these procedures in section 7.2 of the online supplementary information.
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there appears to be little impetus to coordinate a change in majority control; at high levels,
there is little the minority can do to overcome the majority’s cohesion. In both of these cases,
majority-party switches are infrequent. However, at medium levels of modularity, there is a
mix of impetus and relaxed majority cohesion, yielding a party system that is significantly
less stable. We call this interpretation the ‘partial polarization’ hypothesis.
Importantly, our analysis helps us begin to explain why partially-polarized Congresses
exhibit the greatest instability. Using individual-level diagnostics associated with modularity,
we identify the legislators who are most polarizing (via a quantity that we call ‘divisiveness’)
and those who align most closely with their group (via a ‘solidarity’ diagnostic). We show
that divisiveness has a negative impact on individual reelection chances but that the effect
is mitigated for polarizing legislators who exhibit strong solidarity with their group. This, in
turn, yields instability in partially-polarized Congresses. Our analysis corroborates previous
findings that legislators must balance partisan and constituency interests in order to remain
in office (Canes-Wrone et al. 2002), while also providing insight into legislators’ group
affiliations that are not reflected in formal party labels.
3.1 Modularity Defined
We begin with a common assumption about the nature of roll-call votes: Congressmen who
vote with one another are more similar than those whose votes conflict. We further assume
that two Congressmen are more similar when they agree on more roll-call decisions. These
assumptions underly all investigations of roll-call voting blocs (Anderson et al. 1966) from
Rice’s (1927) identification of blocs in small political bodies to Truman’s (1959) case study of
the 81st Congress, early investigations of policy dimensions by MacRae (1958) and Clausen
(1973), and more quantitative analyses by Poole and Rosenthal (1997) and others (Clinton
et al. 2004).
The method of identifying communities that we employ is philosophically similar to the
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cluster analyses employed by Rice and Truman, but those authors had limited computing
power at their disposal and lacked an objective method for evaluating the quality of the
communities that they obtain. However, because of a wealth of conceptual and algorithmic
advances from the past decades (and especially from the past 10 years; Porter et al. 2009,
Fortunato 2010), we have not only an appropriate measure (modularity) but also good
computational algorithms to partition networks into communities in order to maximize it.
In the remainder of this section, we define modularity and describe the methodology that
we use to generate modularity scores.3
Using roll-call data compiled by Poole and Rosenthal (1997, 2011), we generate a network
in the form of an adjacency matrix (Wasserman & Faust 1994) that describes voting similar-
ities among legislators in a single Congress of the House of Representatives or Senate.4 This
is done in similar fashion to the assembly of agreement score matrices in Poole (2005). We
study the 1st–109th Senates and Houses, so we consider 218 networks in total. We represent
each of these networks by an n × n matrix A, where n equals the number of legislators in
the body and each element Aij gives the proportion of votes on which two legislators agreed.
The value of Aij represents the weighted strength of connection between legislators. Having
generated the adjacency matrices, we can calculate modularity values for any given partition
of these roll-call networks into specified, non-overlapping communities (Porter et al. 2009).
Modularity relies on the intuitive notion that communities in networks should consist
of nodes with more intra-community than extra-community ties (Newman & Girvan 2004,
Porter et al. 2009). This mirrors our conceptualization of polarization described in section
2. For a given partition of the network into communities, the modularity Q represents the
fraction of total tie strength contained within the specified communities minus the expected
total strength of such ties. The expected strength depends on an assumed null model. Here
3We provide more details of this process in section 7.2 of the online supplementary information.
4Defined in footnote 1 and discussed in detail in section 7.1 of the online supplementary information.
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we use the standard Newman-Girvan null model that posits a hypothetical network with the
same expected degree distribution as the observed network (Newman 2006a, Newman 2006b).
This standard null model implies that modularity is given by the formula
Q =
1
2m
∑
ij
[
Aij − kikj
2m
]
δ(gi, gj) ≡ 1
2m
∑
ij
Bijδ(gi, gj) , (2)
where m = 1
2
∑
i ki is the total strength of ties in the network, ki =
∑
j Aij is the weighted
degree (i.e., the strength) of the ith node, gi is the community to which i is assigned (and
similarly for gj), and δ(gi, gj) = 1 if i and j belong to the same community and 0 if they do
not. In equation (2) we have defined a modularity matrix B with components Bij = Aij− kikj2m .
Modularity evaluates the quality of community partitions, implying that partitions with
higher modularity are, by our conceptualization, more polarized. However, it remains for
us to determine the community partition that maximizes modularity for each Congress.
We call this the ‘maximum-modularity partition’, though strictly speaking no partition can
ever be proven to be the global optimum without computationally-prohibitive exhaustive
enumeration (modularity maximization is an NP-hard problem; Brandes et al. 2008). As
discussed in the online supplementary information, we consider a variety of computational
heuristics in our optimization of modularity.
3.2 Modularity at the Individual Level
We also consider individual-level diagnostics associated with modularity: divisiveness can be
used to identify the extent to which individual legislators potentially contribute to system-
wide modularity (polarization), and solidarity can be used to measure the alignment of
individual legislators to their communities. Calculating divisiveness and solidarity allow us
to explore hypotheses about the relationship between the behavior of individual legislators
and outcomes of interest (such as reelection rates).
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Mathematically, the divisiveness |xi| of legislator i is obtained from (Newman 2006a)
|xi|2 =
p∑
j=1
(
√
λjUij)
2 , (3)
where p is the number of positive eigenvalues λj of the modularity matrix B and the matrix
element Uij is the ith component of the jth (normalized) eigenvector. That is, xi is a p-
dimensional vector (with jth element equal to
√
λjUij) and the magnitude |xi| of this node
vector measures the potential positive impact on aggregate modularity from legislator i.5
The divisiveness measure uses the roll-call adjacency matrices to estimate the potential
effect that each individual legislator has on the aggregate polarization of his/her legislature,
but it need not say anything about the alignment of that legislator’s voting behavior with
that of his or her own group. Estimating alignment requires us to compare the divisiveness
measure with the associated community vector Xk =
∑
i∈ck xi , where we have summed over
all node vectors corresponding to legislators assigned to the kth community ck. We can then
calculate the solidarity6 cos θik, where θik is the angle between the node vector xi and the
community vector Xk. When the solidarity is close to 1, the legislator and community are
in strong alignment; when the solidarity is close to 0, however, the legislator is not strongly
aligned with his or her community (Newman 2006a).
p
3.3 Modularity and NOMINATE-based Measures
Let us first consider the number of communities revealed by the modularity procedure.
Theoretical models suggest that single-member districts should yield a two-party system
(Duverger 1954, Cox 1997), so we expect most Congresses to achieve their maximum modu-
larity when partitioned into two communities. However, we find three or more communities
5The divisiveness |xi| is known as ‘community centrality’ in the networks literature (Newman 2006a).
6From a networks perspective, one might wish to use the name ‘community alignment’ for the solidarity.
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in 35 of 109 Houses and in 67 of 109 Senates. We tended to obtain more communities when
maximum modularity is low. Maximum modularities in Congresses partitioned into three
or more communities are on average 0.045 lower in the House and 0.066 lower in the Senate
than maximum modularities in two-community Congresses. These differences are both sig-
nificant (p < 0.0001) in one-tailed t-tests. When we constrain our focus to those Houses and
Senates in which the third-largest community is larger than the size difference between the
two largest communities, we find three or more communities in 11 Houses and 31 Senates.
We provide descriptive statistics for these Congresses in section 7.3 of the online supplement
and a historical example from the 19th century in section 7.4.
In figure 1, we compare maximum-modularity values to the NOMINATE-based measure
used by McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal (2007) and described in section 2. Following the
advice of Aldrich et al. (2004), we calculate this measure using two dimensions of DW-
NOM. For reference, we include a calculation of the MPR measure using two-dimensions of
W-NOMINATE (which we hereafter call ‘W-NOM’) as well. For comparability, we rescale
both modularity and the NOMINATE-based measures to lie in the interval [0, 1].
<FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE>
The modularity values in figure 1 are consistent with several stylized facts about po-
larization. Most notably, they capture the spike in polarization associated with the end of
Reconstruction as well as the well-documented modern spike (McCarty et al. 2007). They
also show a lull, corresponding to the era of party decline during the 75th–95th Congresses
(1937–1979) (Coleman 1996). Interestingly, the DW-NOM version of the MPR measure
suggests a much lower level of polarization over this period than does modularity or the
W-NOM version. Further, the DW-NOM-based measure derives much of its visual impact
from its limitation to post-Reconstruction Congresses. The modularity and W-NOM-based
measures show that modern-day polarization is high but not to a greater extent than what
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seems to be the case in many other periods. The low-modularity period of the 75th–95th
Congresses appears to be the exception rather than the rule.
Another difference between modularity and the MPR measure is the year-to-year varia-
tion. DW-NOM assumes that legislators always remain in the same voting bloc and allows
their ideology to move in only one direction over time, resulting in a time series that is
smoother than that for the modularity or W-NOM measures.7 As we discuss below, we
believe that allowing such year-to-year variation is informative.
In addition to maximum modularity Q, we calculate party modularity P , which is the
modularity obtained from the network partitioned so that legislators are assigned to groups
that contain only members of the same party. In figure 2, we report P/Q, which represents
the relative contribution of formal party divisions to total polarization. In periods in which
polarization is predominantly partisan, one finds that P ≈ Q. When P is substantially
less than Q, however, community divisions other than party better explain polarization.
The party partition captures the vast majority of the maximum modularity in all modern
Houses, with the 85th–95th Congress period (1957–1979) serving as a notable exception.
Party importance varies more in the Senate, where it oscillates from one Congress to the
next between the 67th (1921) and 75th (1937) Congresses and is again a smaller fraction of
modularity during the 85th–95th Congresses.
<FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE>
Although the DW-NOM MPR measure suggests a substantially lower polarization level
for the 75th–95th Congresses than does the modularity measure, party modularity nearly
equals maximum modularity for the 75th–84th Houses before dropping off during the 85th–
95th, suggesting that the importance of party did not start to wane until the 85th Congress
7The W-NOM version also suggests higher levels of polarization than maximum modularity for most
Congresses. We have no theory to explain this finding but stress that the W-NOM measure is not a significant
predictor of majority-party switches (see table 1)
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(some 20 years after the decline in the DW-NOM measure). Our results suggest that extra-
partisan coalition tensions generated heightened polarization during this period that is not
captured by DW-NOM, even in two dimensions.8
The existence of a disparity between party allegiance and voting behavior is unsurprising.
Many studies show that parties have reorganized throughout history (Merrill et al. 2008).
These realignments represent changes in the formal allegiances of members of Congress. It
is reasonable to assume that such changes are costly to politicians (Downs 1957b, Cox &
McCubbins 2005), so they are unlikely to be undertaken without substantial prior effort to
salvage the existing party order. As party bonds disintegrate, we reason that some legislators
seek to preserve alliances while other (opportunistic) legislators seek new alliances that reflect
(or perhaps help create) a different order (Riker 1986).
The existing measures of polarization based on DW-NOM are ill-equipped to identify
these shifts for three reasons. First, they assume a party-system structure to orient their
legislators in space, and this assumption might mask the importance of intra-party commu-
nities. Second, DW-NOM is weighted dynamically, which constrains the spatial movement of
legislators over time to a single direction. This restriction allows one to identify ideal points
on a consistent spatial metric over time (Poole 2005). Cox & Poole defend this constraint by
noting many legislators have changed parties over their careers but that none have changed
back (Cox & Poole 2002). This defense is justifiable if exogenously-defined groups, such
as parties, sufficiently capture group dynamics (Poole & Rosenthal 1997), but our results
suggest otherwise. Third, these measures rely on strict assumptions about the nature of
ideology (Downs 1957b) that might be more appropriate for fitting individual roll-call votes
than for examining the effect of group dynamics on formal party divisions.
8Regression results, which we present in section 4, provide some support for this finding in the House but
not in the Senate.
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3.4 Changes in Group Dynamics
One clear indicator of a formal power shift in Congress is a change in the majority party.
When a new majority party is elected, one can normally point to major policy failure on
the part of the previous majority. One important way for a majority party to remain
effective—and for its brand to remain strong—is for its caucus members to coordinate on
a policy agenda. The House and Senate majorities resolve their coordination problems
through various institutional means, such as the delegation of agenda control to leaders and
the appointment of party whips (Rohde 1991, Cox & McCubbins 2005). Willingness to
coordinate depends on a variety of forces, including electoral pressure, ideological cohesion,
and career ambition (Aldrich & Rohde 2001).
When party membership poses electoral risk, members hedge their bets by seeking extra-
partisan coalitions. Modularity captures this dynamic, showing the emergence of third (non-
party) communities and the evolution of party-dominated communities into more heteroge-
nous groups. The less that communities in Congress reflect party labels, the more likely
that interest groups, party organizations, and ultimately voters notice the gap. If these po-
litical actors support the party, then the legislator might be replaced and the party system
might thereby be preserved. However, if they support the legislator, then he/she might ei-
ther switch parties or attempt to bring his/her party closer to his/her district’s preferences.
When party positions shift, we reason, it becomes more difficult for parties and voters to
coordinate on ideology. Thus, electoral volatility increases and changes in formal groups,
such as majority party switches, become more likely.
In order to test the ability of maximum modularity to predict changes in the majority-
party in Congress, we examine the values of modularity in section 4. We then conduct
individual-level analyses in section 5 to examine the ability of divisiveness and solidarity
(which we defined in section 3.2) to predict the electoral fates of House members. In both
cases, we compare regressions using the modularity measures to similar specifications that
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use NOMINATE-based measures as their independent variables.
4 Majority-Party Switches
We begin to explore the relationship between maximum modularity in Congress t and a ma-
jority party switch in the next Congress (t+ 1) using locally weighted polynomial regression
(LOESS) (Loader 1999). Our analyses demonstrate that changes in majority-party switches
are most common when polarization is moderate, and they are relatively uncommon when
polarization is low or high.9 This non-monotonic relationship suggests that it is appropriate
to include both linear and squared modularity scores in multivariate regressions.
4.1 Data, Analyses, and Results
We compiled a time-series data set that covers each of the 4th–109th Congresses.10 The
data set contains both the key independent variable (maximum modularity) and the key
dependent variable (majority-party switches) for each House and Senate. ‘Majority-party
switches’ is a binary variable that takes the value 1 if a switch occurred as a result of the
previous election and a 0 if it did not. Using information provided in Kernell et al. (2009),
we identified 27 switches in the House and 26 switches in the Senate.11
We control for economic indicators such as gross domestic product (GDP), consumer
price index (CPI), and national debt (as a percentage of GDP) (Historical Statistics of the
United States, 2009). We also include indicator variables for divided government, midterm
Congress, and Republican or Democratic majorities. We included the first two variables to
control for the impacts of presidential races on Congressional electoral outcomes and the
9The medium-modularity range is approximately [0.15, 0.30] for the House, and [0.15, 0.23] for the Senate
(see figure 3). We show associated plots in section 7.5.1 of the online supplementary information.
10The accompanying economic data that we gathered were not available for the first three Congressional
sessions.
11We include a table of these switches in section 7.5 of the online supplementary information.
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last two to capture any peculiar effects of a stable two-party system. Finally, we include
an indicator variable for Congresses with three or more communities, expecting that these
Congresses are likely to be particularly unstable.
We conducted logistic regression analyses using several specifications. We first examined
the relationship between future majority-party switches and maximum modularity and its
squared term, while controlling for the lagged dependent variable and the presence of three
(or more) communities. We subsequently added structural and economic control variables for
Congress t and retested the model for majority-party switches in the next Congress (t+ 1).
To aid comparison with NOMINATE-based measures, we report similar specifications using
both W- and DW-NOM-based MPR measures of polarization. MPR analyses are necessarily
limited to Congresses 46-109 (the time period over which DW-NOM is calculated), so we
conducted modularity regressions over this time period as well. We present our results in
table 1.
<TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE>
The regression results show a clear relationship between modularity and majority-party
shifts in the House. In all four specifications, modularity is significant and positive (p < 0.05),
and its squared term is significant and negative (p < 0.05). In the Senate, results are weak.
Modularity approaches significance (p < 0.1) in only two of the four models, and the squared
term approaches significance in only one. Neither the DW- nor W-NOM MPR measures are
significant in any specification in either chamber.
The existence of a non-monotonic relationship between modularity and House majority
switches has important implications for the study of legislative organization and party dy-
namics. With some caution, we offer some preliminary explanations for these results in the
following section. We refer to these results and explanations as our ‘partial polarization’
hypothesis.
18
4.2 Discussion
We believe that the instability of partially-polarized Houses might be driven by the strategic
behavior of legislators, candidates, and other partisans as they attempt to coordinate with
low-information voters. These dynamics are most easily explained by dividing Congresses
into three categories: those with low, medium, and high modularities. We observe that low-
and high-modularity Congresses tend to have stable majorities, whereas the majorities in
medium-modularity Congresses are less stable.
In low-modularity Congresses, communities tend to be weak and are presumably less
informative to political elites and the general electorate. Recall from section 3.3 that Con-
gresses with more than two communities tend to have lower modularity than those with two
communities. If one imagines Congressional activity as a coordination problem, then low-
modularity Congresses are those in which coordination takes place between different coali-
tions on different issues and in which mechanisms to aggregate preferences within groups
have little power. In such an environment, coordination costs are likely to be high, and
individual legislators might see little benefit in group alliances (Olson 1965), which could
result in committee rule (Shepsle & Weingast 1987) or gridlock (Binder 1999). Electoral
institutions (Herrnson 2004) also give Congressmen the incentive to pursue particular bene-
fits for their districts in order to win reelection (regardless of collective impact). In such an
environment, coordination likely occurs through logrolling and the exchange of district-level
benefits.
High-modularity Congresses have the opposite problem: communities are well-defined
and usually party-oriented. Presumably, legislators have solved their coordination problem
by coalescing into voting blocs that reduce the costs of governing and improve the value
of ideological signals to the electorate. Such efficiency comes with a corresponding loss
in voting freedom, as the electoral costs of defecting from a community increase. Donors,
lobbyists, activists, and elites who have invested in the existing community structure might
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be less willing to support defectors, which impairs a Congressman’s ability to fundraise and
decreases his/her chance of reelection. Defection might also muddle the ideological signal to
voters, which could in turn decrease turnout or encourage the consideration of challengers.
Consequently, pressure to conform might explain the dearth of majority switches in these
Houses.
Medium-modularity Congresses reveal environments that are subject to potential flux.
Such Congresses might represent a highly modular environment that is in the process of
breaking down or a poorly-structured environment in the process of consolidating. When
group structures exist but are not well-established, politicians have a strategic incentive
to develop and control stable communities that will convey more effective signals to voters.
The strategic behavior of legislators, in turn, causes communities to fracture and reassemble;
meanwhile, voters attempt to make sense of the more complex environment.
We investigate the strategic incentives of individual legislators in the following section by
using divisiveness and solidarity. These concepts connect modularity and group dynamics
directly to the electoral fortunes of individual legislators.
5 Reelections in the House
We begin with insights that arise from our analyses in section 4.2 on the effect of the
maximum-modularity value on changes in the majority party in Congress. Our ‘partial
polarization’ hypothesis suggests that medium levels of maximum modularity might lead
to instability in Congressional blocs, with some alliances breaking down and others being
forged. At the individual-level, this instability should be reflected in the electoral successes
and failures of legislators. Here we explore the relationship between maximum-modularity,
its associated individual-level quantities (namely, divisiveness and solidarity), and reelection
outcomes in the House. We start this exploration by conducting a series of two-dimensional
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LOESS regressions.12
In our first regression, we find evidence for an interactive effect between modularity and
divisiveness as they impact reelection. Divisive legislators in medium-modularity Houses
have the highest rates of electoral failure but are more successful when modularity is low
or high. In low-modularity Houses, we suspect that this arises because group solidarity is
a less valuable cue for voters when group structures are weak. In high-modularity Houses,
we suspect that divisiveness is only successful in combination with strong group solidarity,
as groups are highly salient in these Congresses and members are likely to be penalized for
defection. In medium-modularity Congresses, the legislative environment appears to be more
complex, as both Congressmen and voters have poorer information about the structure and
salience of communities. This results in coordination failures between Congressmen, parties,
and voters (Downs 1957b), which in turn leads to lower reelection rates.
We conduct a second regression to illuminate the impact of solidarity and divisiveness
on reelection.13 We find that highly divisive Congressmen suffer in their electoral prospects
unless they also have high group solidarity, providing further tentative support for our ‘partial
polarization’ hypothesis. Significant numbers of legislators with both high divisiveness and
high solidarity in a Congress are associated with high modularities (that is, they have a
high potential contribution to modularity and that contribution is realized by their strong
alignment with identified groups; see also the additional regressions in section 7.6 of the online
supplement). In the absence of such strong solidarity, the aggregate maximum modularity
may only reach the medium-modularity level; legislators in such Congresses possibly use
votes to form coalitions (yielding high divisiveness) but are not always successful in forming
cohesive groups in line with the full body of their votes (i.e., low solidarity). Electoral failure
in this case could stem from the loss of activist support (Aldrich 1995) or a coordination
12We show associated plots in section 7.6 of the online supplementary information.
13To aid interpretation, we report correlations between divisiveness and solidarity in section 7.6 of the
online supplementary information. We also report examples of the various legislator types.
21
failure with voters (Downs 1957b).
From these regressions, we derive three testable hypotheses that lend support to our
broader ‘partial polarization’ hypothesis. First, increasing divisiveness causes a decrease in
reelection probability. Second, increasing solidarity increases reelection chances. Finally,
the impaired electoral chances of highly-divisive legislators can be mitigated if their divisive
behavior is consistent with the voting behavior of their community. In other words, we expect
a positive association between electoral success and an interaction between divisiveness and
solidarity (divisiveness × solidarity). We test these three hypotheses in the next subsection.
5.1 Data, Analyses, and Results
In this section, we test our three hypotheses concerning reelection to the House of Represen-
tatives. Our dependent variable is reelection to the House (1 for success, and 0 for defeat).
We exclude legislators who do not participate in the general election. Our explanatory vari-
ables are divisiveness, solidarity, and their interaction. We have rescaled divisiveness to the
interval [0, 1] to make the regression results easier to interpret (solidarity lies in this interval
by definition).
We also include several control variables in our specifications. At the Congress level,
we control for presidential election years and divided government using indicator variables.
At the individual level, we control for party (indicators for ‘Democrat’ and ‘Republican’),
preference extremity (absolute value of first-dimension DW-NOM), seniority (number of
Congresses served), party unity (as defined in Poole 2005), previous margin of victory (per-
centage of votes), and district-level partisanship.14 We pool data for the 56th—103rd Houses
(1899—1995) for our analyses.15
We require a model that can estimate appropriate standard errors for our explanatory
14District-level partisanship is estimated by multiplying the most recent Democratic Presidential vote
(percentage) for a district by the party indicator variables.
15Covariate data were compiled by Keith Poole in collaboration with Andrew Scott Waugh.
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variables while accounting for the nature of the data. To do this, we employ mixed-effects
logistic regression model that allows us to account for both Congress-level and individual-
level components as random effects by calculating random intercepts for these variables
(Gelman & Hill 2007). We draw the random intercepts from a Gaussian distribution with
mean 0 and standard deviation equal to that of the variable. The functional form of the
model resembles a traditional logit model with the random effects as additional parameters:
Pr(yi = 1) = logit
−1(αlegislatori + αCongressi + β
fixed
i + i) . (4)
We evaluate four mixed-effects logistic regression specifications and report our results in
table 2. In the first specification, we regress divisiveness and solidarity against the reelection
indicator. We find that divisiveness has a significant negative impact on reelection chances
and that group solidarity has a significant positive impact. In the second specification, we
also include the interaction of solidarity and divisiveness (Divisiveness × Solidarity). This
model maintains the finding that divisiveness is associated with decreased reelection proba-
bility, and it also suggests that the combination of divisiveness and solidarity has a significant
positive impact on reelection. Although the sign of solidarity flips from positive to negative,
the aggregate effect of solidarity must include the interaction term.16 At even moderately
low levels of divisiveness (i.e., rescaled values of 0.2 or lower), the effect of the interaction
term exceeds the main solidarity effect, suggesting that most legislators benefit from in-
creased solidarity with their community. The third and fourth specifications include the
aforementioned Congress-level and individual-level controls, and they yield similar results.
<TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE>
16The interaction variable projects the node vector onto the group vector of its associated community,
thereby indicating the actual contribution to aggregate modularity that is made by assigning the legislator
to that specific group (Newman 2006a).
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5.2 Discussion
The negative influence of divisiveness suggests that legislators suffer a penalty for polarizing
votes unless they also exhibit high community solidarity, and that this is particularly true
in high-modularity environments. We hypothesize that divisiveness without solidarity not
only disconnects legislators from needed elite support but also complicates the decisions of
rationally-ignorant voters. Conversely, legislators cannot be highly divisive while simulta-
neously maintaining independence from a coalition. Only by appropriately balancing group
solidarity and individual divisiveness do Congressmen maximize their chances at reelection.
Our individual-level results support our Congress-level findings and show significant dif-
ferences in the value of communities across different levels of polarization. In partially-
polarized (i.e., medium-modularity) Congresses, legislators face complex environments in
which their alliance choices are subject both to greater error and to greater risk. In such en-
vironments, they must balance community cohesion with concerns for constituents, activists,
and others who impact their electoral fates.
6 Conclusions
Researchers have long sought to separate the effects of party on voting behavior from elec-
toral, interest-group, and other pressures. Prior studies have assumed the existence and
structure of parties (Poole & Rosenthal 1997)—or of alternate mechanisms such as com-
mittees (Shepsle & Weingast 1987) or institutional veto players (Tsebelis 2002)—to derive
implications for the structure of roll-call voting. These studies have tended to consider their
organizational mechanisms in isolation, which our results suggest might be a mistake.
In this paper, we have used the network-science concept of modularity to provide a
novel measure of polarization in Congress. Using roll-call data, we calculated the commu-
nity structures that maximize modularity for the 1st–109th Houses of Representatives and
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Senates. Such structure includes the membership of each community and also (via modu-
larity) indicates the cohesiveness of communities. We argue that modularity offers a clearer
and more parsimonious measure of polarization than existing measures that are based on
spatial-modeling assumptions. The introduction of modularity and related measures to the
analysis of Congressional behavior has the potential to fundamentally alter the study of
group dynamics and partisanship in legislatures.
We demonstrate the value of this modularity by demonstrating that there exists a non-
monotonic relationship between modularity and majority party switches in the House, which
suggests that ‘partially-polarized’ Congresses are more unstable than ones with either low
or high levels of polarization. Similar uses of NOMINATE-based polarization measures fail
to replicate this result. We further investigate the ‘partial polarization’ hypothesis using
divisiveness and solidarity, which capture the individual-level impacts of legislative alliances,
and we find that these measures are significant predictors of reelections in the House.
Modularity provides a valuable and parsimonious benchmark measure of polarization
against which to compare alternate legislative orderings. By comparing the maximum mod-
ularity of a Congress to modularities calculated either using party divisions or using any
other exogenously-determined partition, one might be able to identify the conditions under
which particular structural arrangements succeed and fail. This, in turn, might help to
disentangle the complex interplay of environmental, ideological, and institutional pressures
that impact the structure of Congressional voting. Our results also suggest that community
structure in Congress strongly influences the strategic incentives of political elites to preserve
or subvert existing order, and that the value in pursuing a new order depends on the presence
of community structures that are neither too strong to break nor too weak to identify.
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Supplementary Information
7.1 Generation of Adjacency Matrices
In this section, we describe in detail the process by which we calculated adjacency matrices
using House and Senate roll-call data (which we obtained from voteview.com) . For each
legislative body, roll calls for a two-year Congress are encoded in an n× b matrix M. Each
matrix element Mik equals 1 if legislator i voted yea on bill k, −1 if he/she voted nay, and 0
otherwise. Because we are interested in characterizing similarities between legislators (rather
than direct connections between legislators and bills), we transform the voting matrix into
an n × n adjacency matrix A whose elements Aij ∈ [0, 1] represent the extent of voting
agreement between legislators i and j. We define these matrix elements by
Aij =
1
bij
∑
k
γijk , (5)
where γijk equals 1 if legislators i and j voted the same on bill k and 0 otherwise, and bij is
the total number of bills on which both legislators voted. Because perfect similarity between
a legislator and him/herself provides no information, we set all diagonal elements to be zero
(i.e., Aii = 0). The matrix A thereby encodes a network of weighted ties between legislators,
and the weights are determined by the similarity of their roll-call records in a single two-year
Congress.
Following the guidelines of Poole & Rosenthal (1997) and Anderson et al. (1966), we
consider only ‘non-unanimous’ roll-call votes. A roll-call vote is classified as ‘non-unanimous’
if at least 3% of legislators are in the minority. For modern Congresses, this implies that a
roll-call minority must contain at least 4 Senators or at least 13 Representatives to yield a
‘non-unanimous’ vote. This ensures that our data sets mirror those used by McCarty, Poole,
and Rosenthal (2007), permitting more explicit comparison of our polarization measure with
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theirs.
7.2 Community-Detection Heuristics
In this section, we list and provide brief descriptions of the community-detection heuristics
that we used to calculate maximum modularity partitions of the Senate and House networks.
We also indicate references that provide complete specifications of the algorithms. We note
that it is important to consider several such algorithms when studying community structure
by optimizing a quality function such as modularity (Fortunato & Barthe´lemy 2007, Porter,
Onnela & Mucha 2009, Fortunato 2010, Good, de Montjoye & Clauset 2010). In the results of
our investigation, we partition each network using various community-detection algorithms,
and we use in each case the highest-modularity partition that we obtained.
<TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE>
<TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE>
Heuristics 1–5 are all spectral methods of modularity optimization. Spectral methods
use eigenvectors of the modularity matrix B that are associated to B’s largest positive
eigenvalues. Heuristics 1–3 consist of three different implementations in which we use only the
leading eigenvector (i.e., the one associated with the largest eigenvalue), so the final partition
is obtained from recursive steps involving partitions of some portion of the network into two
smaller pieces (Newman 2006b, Newman 2006a, Fortunato 2010). The difference between
the heuristics 1–3 arises from the use of different tie-breaking and fine-tuning procedures,
which attempt to improve partitions between the recursive spectral partitioning steps. In
heuristics 4 and 5, we use the two eigenvectors associated with the two largest eigenvalues
of B (Richardson, Mucha & Porter 2009): Heuristic 4 allows only bi-partitioning steps,
whereas heuristic 5 allows both bi-partitioning and tri-partitioning steps. Heuristic 6, known
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as the ‘Louvain’ method, is a locally greedy modularity-optimization technique (Blondel,
Guillaume, Lambiotte & Lefebvre 2008, Fortunato 2010). Heuristic 7 employs simulated
annealing to maximize modularity (Reichardt & Bornholdt 2006, Fortunato 2010).
All of the results from heuristics 1–7 have been improved by subsequent application of a
Kernighan-Lin algorithm (Kernighan & Lin 1970, Porter, Onnela & Mucha 2009, Fortunato
2010) (via the specification described in Newman 2006a, Richardson, Mucha & Porter 2009).
This algorithm takes the community partitions generated by the heuristics and conducts a
series of node swaps—moving nodes from one community to another—in order to find higher
modularity values. This is a fine-tuning procedure that can be applied to the partition
obtained from any other method.
Heuristic 8 is the walktrap algorithm (Pons & Latapy 2005). This algorithm starts by
partitioning the network into n communities that each contain a single node (i.e., a single
legislator). It calculates a distance between each pair of communities and then begins merg-
ing groups by taking random walks between them. After each merging step, one calculates
the modularity score for the current partition. The algorithm finishes after n− 1 steps when
the nodes have been merged into a single community and reports the highest-modularity
partition that it observed during the whole process.
Finally, heuristic 9 is a classical cluster-analysis procedure, which we include for compar-
ison with modularity-maximizing community-detection heuristics. This ‘partitioning around
medoids’ (PAM) cluster-analysis technique is related to the popular k-means clustering pro-
cedure (which divides a network into precisely k communities), but is more robust: one
ordinarily needs to specify k in advance—which is inappropriate for our investigation—but
the PAM method allows one to determine an optimum number of communities based on
mean silhouette width (Kaufman & Rousseeuw 1990).
In tables 3 and 4, we provide summary statistics about the community-detection heuris-
tics we used. Note that the modularity values obtained using different modularity-optimization
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heuristics vary little, especially in the House. Additionally, neither the cluster-analysis tech-
nique nor the walktrap algorithm ever obtain the best result. Moreover, by using many
different computational heuristics, we more confidently sample the complicated modularity
landscape to find higher-modularity partitions to employ in our subsequent analysis. As
has been discussed in a recent paper on modularity-optimization in practical contexts (i.e.,
situations that consider real-world networks) (Good, de Montjoye & Clauset 2010), the use
of multiple different optimization heuristics is an important protocol to follow.
7.3 Descriptive Statistics for Congresses with Three or More Com-
munities
In table 5, we give descriptive statistics for Congresses in which community-detection identi-
fies three or more communities. In the table, we list all Congresses in which the third-largest
community has at least as many legislators as the number in the largest community minus
the number in the second-largest community. For each community in such Congresses, we
give the size (i.e., number of legislators), mean divisiveness of legislators, and mean solidarity
of legislators.
<TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE>
7.4 A Descriptive Example from the 19th Century
As we discussed in Section 3.3, modularity and its associated individual-level quantities can
be used to investigate party polarization even during periods of history that include more
than two dominant parties. In this section, we demonstrate the utility of modularity using
an illustrative 19th century example.
In the early 19th century, the fledgling party system of the United States was go-
ing through a transitional period. The existing party system, which pitted the dominant
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Democratic-Republicans against a dying Federalist party, finally broke down in the 18th
Congress (1823–1825) as the Democratic-Republicans broke ranks based on their affiliations
with national leaders (most notably, John Quincy Adams and Andrew Jackson). This re-
sulted in a new period, reflected by partisan conflict between supporters of Adams and
supporters of Jackson, which lasted until the emergence of the Whigs and the Democratic
party in the 25th Congress (1837–1839) (Kernell, Jacobson & Kousser 2009). The time
series of maximum modularity (table 1) captures this transition nicely and provides ev-
idence that group structures began to change as early as the 14th Congress—before the
Democratic-Republicans divided into the aforementioned camps. The Adams-Jackson party
system finally emerged in the 19th Congress, representing a majority-party switch in both
chambers.
One can see using modularity that the breakdown of the Democratic-Republican Party
first becomes apparent in the transition from the 13th to 14th Congress (i.e., with the 1814
election). The second largest negative shift in maximum modularity over the last 200 years
occurs during this transition in both chambers (−0.152 in the House and −0.085 in the
Senate). This decline is particularly interesting given that the country was experiencing a
unified Democratic-Republican government and that the Democratic-Republicans held huge
majorities in both chambers. Some of this decline is likely due to the end of the War of 1812
during the 13th Congress. With the war over, the Democratic-Republicans no longer needed
to maintain a united front, which freed legislators to pursue alternate agendas.
This breakdown yielded a maximum-modularity partition with four communities in the
Senate (containing 14, 13, 12, and 5 Senators), and three communities in the House (con-
taining 80, 71 and 44 Representatives), suggesting that Democratic-Republicans in the both
chambers were already beginning to explore alternate alliance structures. In table 5 we see
that the mean solidarity scores for the 14th Congress communities are 0.70, 076, 0.66, and
0.82 in the Senate and 0.5, 0.58, and 0.57 in the House. Compare these to the 13th Congress,
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in which both chambers have two communities, with sizes of 26 and 20 in the Senate and 117
and 78 in the House, and mean solidarity scores of 0.63 and 0.74 in the Senate, and 0.78 and
0.87 in the House. While mean solidarity appears not to vary across the 13th-14th Senates,
mean solidarity in the House appear substantially lower in the 14th Congress than the 13th.
The decrease in solidarity, coupled with the increase in the number of communities, suggests
a weakening of party control over the House in this period.
In the House, this transition becomes further apparent in the 17th Congress (1821–
1823), where we again identify three communities when the Democratic-Republican party
is nominally whole and maintaining large majorities in both chambers of Congress. These
communities contain 78, 65, and 56 legislators (see table 5). By the 18th Congress, the
divisions within the Democratic-Republican party become formally acknowledged, as three
camps emerge behind the leadership of Adams, Jackson, and William Crawford. This formal
recognition results in a dramatic increase in the maximum modularity of the House compared
to the previous Congress, demonstrating the impact that formal party divisions can have on
legislator behavior.
The same basic groups had emerged during the 17th House but had not yet formally
consolidated into well-defined camps, as evidenced by their mean solidarity scores (0.39,
0.40, and 0.49). After this consolidation, however, the cost to coordinate had become lower,
with an accompanying increase in maximum modularity and the elimination of the third
major community in the modularity-maximizing structure. In this case, the two largest
communities contain 114 and 104 legislators.17 The elimination of the third community
despite the emergence of a third party is especially interesting, as it suggests that two of
the parties saw the institutional value in coordinating on roll-call votes in order to pursue
their own agendas in a majority-rule institution. This is corroborated by the mean solidarity
17We technically observe 4 communities in the 18th House, but the third and fourth communities contain
only 2 and 1 legislators respectively.
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scores for the two largest communities, 0.62 and 0.61 respectively, which are substantially
higher than the three large communities identified in the 17th House. Thus, the maximum-
modularity time series identifies the presence of a coalition government in the 18th House.
By the 19th House, however, the party system reforms into the pro-Adams and pro-Jackson
divisions. A majority-party switch occurs, the pro-Adams party assumes control of both
chambers, and a two-community structure emerges. A significant third community does not
emerge again until the 32nd Congress (1851–1853).
We see from this historical example that there is a lag between formal definitions of party
and the emergence of coalitions in Congress, and that this lag can work in both directions.
In the 14th Senate and 17th House, we identify four and three communities, respectively,
in a period in which only two parties nominally existed. When a three-party system be-
comes recognized in the 18th Congress, maximum modularity increases and the number of
communities in the House reduces to two. Modularity thus captures a fascinating distinc-
tion between the formal, self-identifying claims of political parties and what coordinating
activities are revealed by actual voting behavior.
7.5 Modularity and Majority Party Switches
In this section, we present table 6, which summarizes the changes in majority party in the
United States Congress from 1788-2002. These switches are used to generate the dependent
variable for our Congress-level regressions in section 4 of the main text.
<TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE>
7.5.1 Congress-level LOESS Plots
In this section, we present plots of our Congress-level LOESS regressions (Loader 1999) to
supplement section 4 of the text. Observe the non-monotonic relationship between maximum
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modularity and majority party switches.
<FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE>
7.6 Divisiveness and Solidarity
The plots and tables in this section supplement section 5 of the main text. Note in figure 5
and table 7 that divisiveness, solidarity, and their interaction (divisiveness × solidarity) are
positively correlated but clearly provide different pieces of information.
7.6.1 Two-Dimensional LOESS Plots
In addition to the LOESS regressions discussed in section 5, here we also examine the rela-
tionship between divisiveness, solidarity, and the maximum-modularity level of Congress. As
expected from the definitions of these quantities, we find that high-modularity Congresses
are characterized by high levels of divisiveness and solidarity, as they are composed of com-
munities that are highly structured and partisan. When either divisiveness or solidarity
values dip, however, then medium-modularity Congresses become more likely. Instability
in medium-modularity cases appears to be driven either by divisiveness without solidarity
or vice versa. Intuitively, a legislator who is divisive but not solidary holds highly divisive
positions while nevertheless being assigned to a large community (i.e., low solidarity). A
legislator who is solidary but not divisive tends to side with his/her community on most
issues but holds broadly popular positions on other issues.
<FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE>
7.6.2 Correlations and Scatter Plots
<TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE>
<FIGURE 5 ABOUT HERE>
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7.6.3 Divisiveness and Solidarity Summary Statistics
In this section, we provide additional details on the divisiveness and solidarity of individual
legislators. Table 8 gives summary statistics for legislators who are divisive (90th percentile
or more) but not solidary (10th percentile or less), solidary but not divisive, both solidary
and divisive, and neither solidary nor divisive. In table 9, we give examples of legislators
who fall into each of these four categories.
<TABLE 8 ABOUT HERE>
<TABLE 9 ABOUT HERE>
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Figure 1: [Color online] Longitudinal comparison of modularity and MPR measures in the
House (Panel A) and Senate (Panel B). Each measure has been rescaled to [0, 1] for vi-
sual convenience. Maximum modularity lies in the interval [0.039, 0.364] in the House and
[0.061, 0.285] in the Senate. 36
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Figure 2: [Color online] Longitudinal plot of party modularity divided by maximum mod-
ularity for both the House and Senate. The contribution of party to maximum modularity
varies considerably over time, particularly in the Senate, suggesting that polarization in
Congress is usually, but not always, driven by formal party divisions.
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Figure 3: [Color online] LOESS plot of maximum modularity in Congress t versus majority
party change in Congress t+ 1 for the House and Senate. Majority party changes are most
probable during medium-modularity Congresses.
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Panel A: Divisiveness, Modularity, Reelection
0.
10
0.
15
0.
20
0.
25
0.
30
0.
35
0.0010 0.0015 0.0020 0.0025 0.0030 0.0035
Divisiveness
M
od
ul
ar
ity
High
Reelection
Rate
Low
Rate
Panel B: Divisiveness, Solidarity, Modularity
0.
05
0.
20
0.
40
0.
60
0.
80
1.
00
0.0010 0.0015 0.0020 0.0025 0.0030 0.0035
Divisiveness
S
ol
id
ar
ity
High
Modularity
Low
Modularity
Panel C: Divisiveness, Solidarity, Reelection
0.
05
0.
20
0.
40
0.
60
0.
80
1.
00
0.0010 0.0015 0.0020 0.0025 0.0030 0.0035
Divisiveness
S
ol
id
ar
ity
High
Reelection
Rate
Low
Rate
Figure 4: [Color online] Two-Dimensional LOESS plots indicating the relationship between
modularity, divisiveness, solidarity, and reelection rates in the House of Representatives.
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Panel A: Divisiveness and Solidarity
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Figure 5: [Color online] Scatter plots illustrating the relationship between divisiveness, soli-
darity, and their interaction for the House of Representatives. All variables are scaled to lie
in the interval [0, 1].
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Panel A: Fixed Effects
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Divisiveness −4.737 (0.267) *** −11.660 (0.741) *** −12.728 (0.761) *** −12.789 (0.761) ***
Solidarity 1.417 (0.134) *** −1.700 (0.346) *** −1.368 (0.362) *** −1.353 (0.362) ***
Divisiveness×Solidarity 10.030 (0.992) *** 10.874 (1.002) *** 10.990 (1.003) ***
Presidential Year −0.293 (0.205) −0.299 (0.202)
Divided Government −0448 (0.217) * −0.449 (0.215) *
|Nominate (1st dim.)| 0.967 (0.247) *** 0.842 (0.250) ***
Democrat −1.495 (0.428) *** −1.723 (0.469) ***
Republican −1.369 (0.428) ** −0.837 (0.470) .
Seniority −0.062 (0.009) *** −0.062 (0.009) ***
Party Unity −0.010 (0.003) *** −0.011 (0.003) ***
Victory Margin 0.038 (0.002) *** 0.037 (0.002) ***
Democrat×Dem. Pres. Vote 0.005 (0.004)
Republican×Dem. Pres. Vote −0.012 (0.005) **
(Intercept) 2.855 (0.155) *** 4.932 (0.267) *** 6.313 (0.551) *** 6.395 (0.552) ***
Standard errors in parentheses. Significance codes (p <): *** 0.001, ** 0.01, * 0.05, . 0.1. N = 16891
Panel B: Random Effects
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Legislator (ICPSR) 0.933 0.970 0.633 0.633
(Number of Legislators = 3867) (0.966) (0.985) (0.796) (0.796)
Congress (#) 0.461 0.430 0.436 0.422
(Number of Congresses = 48) (0.679) (0.655) (0.661) (0.650)
Variances reported with standard deviations in parentheses.
Table 2: Mixed-Effects Logistic Regression Results for the 56th–103rd Houses. The depen-
dent variable is reelection to the House. The key independent variables are divisiveness,
solidarity, and their interaction. Note that divisiveness and solidarity individually have a
negative impact on electoral prospects but that the interaction has a positive impact. This
suggests that divisiveness might only be sustainable for Congressmen who are also strong
members of a community.
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# Method House Senate
1 Leading-Eigenvector Spectral 1 (Newman 2006b, Newman 2006a) 76 (76) 49 (49)
2 Leading-Eigenvector Spectral 2 (Newman 2006b, Newman 2006a) 75 (1) 48 (4)
3 Leading-Eigenvector Spectral 3 (Newman 2006b, Newman 2006a) 75 (1) 45 (0)
4 Two-Vector Bi-partitioning (Richardson, Mucha & Porter 2009) 81 (5) 63 (9)
5 Two-Vector Bi/Tri-partitioning (Richardson, Mucha & Porter 2009) 90 (9) 69 (3)
6 Louvain (Blondel et al. 2008) 91 (14) 88 (39)
7 Simulated Annealing (Reichardt & Bornholdt 2006) 83 (3) 66 (5)
8 Walktrap (Pons & Latapy 2005) 0 (0) 0 (0)
9 PAM Cluster Analysis (Kaufman & Rousseeuw 1990) 0 (0) 0 (0)
Mean Modularity Interval 0.0041 0.0166
Mean Identical to ‘Maximum-Modularity’ Partition (minimum 1) 5.8807 4.6239
Table 3: Summary Statistics for Community-Detection Heuristics. In this table, we compare
the partitions that we obtained using the eight modularity-optimization heuristics and the
one that we obtained using a standard cluster-analysis technique. Rows 1–9 give the number
of Congresses (out of 109) for which each measure finds the ‘maximum-modularity’ partition.
In parentheses, we report the number of Congresses for which we subsequently used the re-
sults of each method in our analyses. Row 10 gives the mean modularity interval for the nine
methods. Row 11 gives the mean number of heuristics that find the ‘maximum-modularity’
community partition. These results suggest that community partitions in Congress are fairly
robust to different heuristics for optimizing modularity.
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# Method House Senate
1 Leading-Eigenvector Spectral 1 (Newman 2006b, Newman 2006a) 3–13, 16, 23–26, 28, 30–36,
39, 41–43, 45–49, 51, 53–60,
62–72, 74, 76–78, 82–84, 87–
89, 93, 94, 97–99, 100, 102,
104–109
2, 4, 7, 11–13, 16, 19, 22–24,
26–28, 32, 36, 43–45, 47, 48,
50–53, 55, 57–64, 66, 67, 82,
84, 87, 90, 93, 94, 103–109
2 Leading-Eigenvector Spectral 2 (Newman 2006b, Newman 2006a) 79 1, 21, 33, 37
3 Leading-Eigenvector Spectral 3 (Newman 2006b, Newman 2006a) 40 none
4 Two-Vector Bi-partitioning (Richardson, Mucha & Porter 2009) 20, 22, 44, 61, 80 15, 42, 56, 75, 86, 95, 96, 100,
102
5 Two-Vector Bi/Tri-partitioning (Richardson, Mucha & Porter 2009) 2, 15, 17, 18, 21, 27, 37, 38,
91
29, 39, 65
6 Louvain (Blondel et al. 2008) 14, 29, 50, 52, 73, 75, 81, 85,
90, 92, 95, 96, 101, 103
3, 5, 6, 8, 10, 14, 17, 18, 20,
25, 30, 31, 34, 35, 38, 40, 41,
46, 49, 68-74, 77, 79–81, 83,
88, 89, 91, 92, 97, 97–101
7 Simulated Annealing (Reichardt & Bornholdt 2006) 1, 19, 86 9, 54, 76, 78, 85
8 Walktrap (Pons & Latapy 2005) none none
9 PAM Cluster Analysis (Kaufman & Rousseeuw 1990) none none
Table 4: This table lists the specific congresses for which each community-detection heuristic
yielded the ‘maximum-modularity’ partition. These partitions were subsequently used for
individual-level analyses in section 5.
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Panel A: House
Year Congress Old New
1792 3 Fed Dem-Rep
1794 4 Dem-Rep Fed
1800 7 Fed Dem-Rep
1824 19 Dem-Rep Adams
1826 20 Adams Jackson
1836 25 Jackson Dem
1840 27 Dem Whig
1842 28 Whig Dem
1846 30 Dem Whig
1848 31 Whig Dem
1854 34 Dem Rep
1856 35 Rep Dem
1858 36 Dem Rep
1874 44 Rep Dem
1880 47 Dem Rep
1882 48 Rep Dem
1888 51 Dem Rep
1890 52 Rep Dem
1894 54 Dem Rep
1910 62 Rep Dem
1918 66 Dem Rep
1930 72 Rep Dem
1946 80 Dem Rep
1948 81 Rep Dem
1952 83 Dem Rep
1954 84 Rep Dem
1994 104 Dem Rep
Panel B: Senate
Year Congress Old New
1800 7 Fed Dem-Rep
1824 19 Dem-Rep Adams
1826 20 Adams Jackson
1832 23 Dem Anti-Jackson
1834 24 Anti-Jackson Jackson
1836 25 Jackson Dem
1840 27 Dem Whig
1844 29 Whig Dem
1860 37 Dem Rep
1878 46 Rep Dem
1880 47 Dem Rep
1892 53 Rep Dem
1894 54 Dem Rep
1912 63 Rep Dem
1914 64 Dem Rep
1918 66 Rep Dem
1932 73 Dem Rep
1946 80 Rep Dem
1948 81 Dem Rep
1952 83 Rep Dem
1954 84 Dem Rep
1980 97 Rep Dem
1986 100 Dem Rep
1994 104 Rep Dem
2000 107 Dem Rep
2002 108 Rep Dem
Table 6: Majority Party Switches in the U.S. Congress (1788–2002).
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Divisiveness Solidarity Interaction
Divisiveness 1
Solidarity 0.253 1
Interaction 0.866 0.653 1
Table 7: Pearson correlations between Divisiveness, Solidarity, and their Interaction
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Congress Name State District Party Divisiveness Solidarity Interaction
Divisive but not Solidary (10 least solidary listed)
63 LOFT G.W. NY 13 Dem 0.8264 0.0179 0.0148
77 WHIITEN MS 2 Dem 0.6724 0.0639 0.0429
66 SULLIVAN NY 13 Dem 0.5915 0.0881 0.0521
61 BROUSSARD LA 3 Dem 0.5748 0.0905 0.0520
82 IKARD TX 13 Dem 0.5422 0.1087 0.0589
75 CONNERY MA 7 Dem 0.6076 0.1233 0.0749
71 OCONNELL RI 3 Dem 0.5892 0.1260 0.0742
89 THOMPSON LA 7 Dem 0.5133 0.1331 0.0683
59 ADAMS H.C WI 2 Rep 0.8049 0.1333 0.1073
59 PRINCE IL 10 Rep 0.5092 0.1496 0.0762
Solidary but not Divisive (10 least divisive listed)
95 LUKEN OH 1 Dem 0.0059 0.9502 0.0056
101 CARR MI 6 Dem 0.0846 0.9488 0.0803
101 CARPER T DE 1 Dem 0.1106 0.9531 0.1054
97 SMITH N. IA 5 Dem 0.1152 0.9518 0.1097
101 ENGLISH OK 6 Dem 0.1154 0.9761 0.1127
94 VAN DEERLI CA 37 Dem 0.1193 0.9577 0.1143
95 SPELLMAN MD 5 Dem 0.1204 0.9462 0.1139
101 SARPALIUS TX 13 Dem 0.1229 0.9828 0.1208
98 MCNULTY J AZ 5 Dem 0.1270 0.9788 0.1243
100 CARR MI 6 Dem 0.1279 0.9759 0.1248
Solidary and Divisive (10 highest interactions listed)
67 KITCHIN C NC 2 Dem 0.7742 0.9782 0.7573
56 ELLIOTT SC 7 Dem 0.7272 0.9477 0.6892
59 HOWARD W. GA 8 Dem 0.7055 0.9549 0.6737
58 POU E.W. NC 4 Dem 0.6931 0.9541 0.6613
58 RANDELL C TX 5 Dem 0.6944 0.9495 0.6594
59 MCCLAIN MS 6 Dem 0.6932 0.9504 0.6588
60 SMITH W.R TX 16 Dem 0.6901 0.9514 0.6566
59 CANDLER E MS 1 Dem 0.6701 0.9699 0.6499
59 ROBINSON AR 6 Dem 0.6851 0.9466 0.6485
58 WALLACE R AR 7 Dem 0.6691 0.9689 0.6482
Neither Solidary nor Divisive (10 lowest interactions listed)
98 RINALDO W NJ 12 Rep 0.0863 0.0005 0.0000
95 RINALDO W NJ 12 Rep 0.1406 0.0008 0.0001
97 WHITLEY NC 3 Dem 0.1292 0.0017 0.0002
102 RAY R GA 3 Dem 0.1435 0.00416 0.0006
94 DERRICK SC 3 Dem 0.0110 0.0533 0.0006
93 STUCKEY GA 8 Dem 0.0799 0.0084 0.0007
98 BENNETT C FL 2 Dem 0.0459 0.017308 0.0008
96 NELSON C FL 9 Dem 0.0488 0.0213 0.0010
95 GIBBONS FL 10 Dem 0.0515 0.0265 0.0014
97 BENNETT C FL 2 Dem 0.0430 0.0369 0.0016
Table 9: Examples of House members who are divisive but not solidary, solidary but not
divisive, solidary and divisive, and neither solidary nor divisive.
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